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The Relevance of the AutoPact to Other Sectoral Arrangements
by Philip H. Trezise *
I. INTRODUCTION
Looked at solely in terms of the subsequent growth of trade, the 1965
Automotive Products Agreement between the United States and Can-
ada must be taken to have been one of the most successful tariff negotia-
tions in history. The value of Canadian-American trade in vehicles and
parts rose from $705 million in 1964, the last full year of customs duties,
to $35 billion in 1984. Adjusting for intervening price increases, the vol-
ume of two-way automotive trade appears to have grown about twenty-
four times since 1964,1 a rate far greater than that of bilateral trade
otherwise.2
Common sense tells us these developments cannot have been in-
dependent of the provisions of the Agreement, the most important of
which called for the mutual elimination of tariffs on vehicles and compo-
nent parts. Therefore, the least ambiguous of the lessons to be drawn
from post-Agreement events is that tariffs do indeed matter.
This would seem to be a self-evident conclusion, but the prevailing
wisdom is to devalue tariff reductions as a negotiating objective.3 The
experience, however, of Canadian-American automotive trade, to say
nothing of the European Community and the European Free Trade As-
sociation, supports the proposition that the removal of import duties can
powerfully stimulate trade between nations. There is no reason to sup-
pose that the world has so changed as to invalidate this proposition
today.4
It is not necessary, of course, and certainly not prudent, to expect
that further sectoral free-trade arrangements between Canada and the
* Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.); member, Council on Foreign
Relations; member, Advisory Board, Consumer Education Council on World Trade. Mr. Trezise is
a former Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and was the principal United States
negotiator of the 1965 Canada-United States Automotive Agreement (AutoPact).
1 Using the U.S. deflator for the auto sector (1972= 100): statisics for 1964 from DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCouNrs, 1929-1974, 287 (1975); and for 1984
from DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BusiNESS, 16 (table 7.8) (Jan. 1985).
2 Bilateral trade, exclusive of autos, tripled between 1964 and 1984 (with values adjusted by the
export and import deflators). DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC REPORT 1967, 309 (table B-82);
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC REPORT 1985, 347 (table B-100).
3 See, e-g., R. GREY, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980'S: AN AGENDA FOR CANADIAN-U.S. RELA-
TIONS, (C.D. Howe Institute, 1981).
4 See generally P. Morici and L. Megna, US. Economic Policies Affecting Industrial Trad" A
Quantitative Assessment, NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION, REPORT No. 200 (1983).
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United States could generate the spectacular rates of increase in trade
volume seen as a result of the AutoPact. The automotive sector had and
has characteristics not likely to be reproduced elsewhere. Nonetheless, if
negotiations can identify areas where tariffs can be eliminated-or realis-
tically scheduled for elimination-the likelihood is that trade would then
noticeably increase. In most circumstances, this increased trade will de-
pend on the attainment of higher levels of efficiency in the sectors where
tariff barriers have been dropped.
Caution is in order, however, before making the conclusion that the
Agreement provides grounds for recommending additional sector-limited
free-trade between Canada and the United States. The fact that there
have been no new sectoral agreements in the twenty years since 1965
ought itself be a signal that the conditions for successful negotiation may
not be easy to achieve. Beyond that, the situation of the North American
auto industry and the environment in Washington and Ottawa in the
mid-1960's were in some respects special, as were certain features of the
eventual Agreement. Furthermore, whatever gains and benefits can be
said to have followed from free-trade in automobiles, it is very doubtful
the sectoral approach can be made economically preferable to the possi-
ble alternatives: either a phased, across-the-board move to zero duties in
Canadian-American trade, or a significant multilateral dismantling of
trade barriers.
II. THE AUTOPACT NEGOTIATIONS
To pursue the argument further requires a brief discussion of the
circumstances in which the Agreement was reached. In 1964, per capita
disposable income in Canada was 67% of that in the United States. The
number of motor vehicles per person was 71% of that in the United
States.5 That is, although Canada was a markedly poorer country than
the United States, Canadian consumers had a slightly more pronounced
preference for automobile ownership than did Americans.
A preponderance of the vehicles driven in Canada were produced by
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler-primarily, but not exclusively, in
their Canadian assembly plants. These plants operated under a 17.5%
tariff on imported vehicles and a similar, or sometimes higher, duty on
automotive components. These tariffs, together with a Canadian "con-
tent cum rebate" provision, made automobile assembly in Canada
profitable.6
However, the total Canadian market for new cars, trucks and
buses-imported and domestically produced-in 1964, was only 711,000
vehicles. Imports, principally from Japan and Western Europe, ac-
counted for 19% of these. Vehicles assembled in Canada were thus less
5 C. BEIGIE, THE CANADA-U.S. AUTOMOTIVE AGREEMENT: AN EVALUATION, 12 (1970).
6 Id. at 16-17.
[Vol. 10:63 1985]
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than 600,000.1 Most of this total was divided among the Big Three, each
producing the multiple models demanded by the Canadian public. The
optimum scale for assembly of a single model was then between 180,000
and 200,000 units per year.' Obviously, by North American industry
standards, none of the Canadian operations could have been close to hav-
ing efficient production.9
Canada had within its power a partial answer. It could have cut the
tariffs on imports to a low (or zero) level, making it feasible for manufac-
turers to concentrate Canadian production on a narrow range of prod-
ucts for domestic sale and export while meeting the consumer preference
for a wide choice of models by imports. However the American tariff,
while lower than the Canadian, (6.5% on cars and 8.5% on trucks and
vehicles parts) was a sufficient barrier to close off this potential avenue to
greater efficiency.
During the decade preceding the negotiation of the AutoPact, the
government in Ottawa had been increasingly preoccupied with the per-
ceived problem of its external trade deficit, a sizable part of which could
be ascribed to trade in the automotive sector. In 1962-63, as a means of
coping with what was viewed in Ottawa as a potentially untenable pay-
ments situation, the Canadian government established a program of tariff
remissions on automotive imports. These remissions were contingent on
the achievement of parallel increases in automotive exports.
A few months after it had been put fully into operation, this pro-
gram attracted a petition from a Wisconsin radiator producer for coun-
tervailing tariff relief under the "Bounty or Grant" section of the Tariff
Act of 1930.10 It was clear from the beginning that the Canadian remis-
sion scheme would be found to be a countervailing duty-which would
have quashed the scheme. What would have happened next is less clear.
The Canadian government considered alternatives, but decided on none
because, at the American initiative, talks were begun to consider the pos-
sibility of an automotive free-trade sector.
The reasons for Washington's decision to explore the free-trade
route have relevance today. Paramount was the disinclination to have a
confrontation with Ottawa over a countervailing duty. It may be recal-
led that Congressional and industry fascination with the countervail au-
thority was less fervent then, which made the search for an alternative
easier to undertake than would be true in a similar situation today.
There was also, no doubt, some feeling among free-traders in the Admin-
istration that a breakthrough in a major sector would be a significant step
7 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE U.S.-CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE AGREE-
MENT: ITS HISTORY, TERMS AND IMPACT (tables Al, A43, A55, A74) (1976).
8 See generally L. WHrrE, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945 (1971).
9 The current chairman of General Motors Corp. has said that in 1964, GM of Canada pro-
duced 20 models and a total of 334,000 vehicles. R. B. Smith, Remarks before the Automotive Parts
Manufacturers' Association of Canada (Jan. 16, 1985).
10 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 66-69.
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toward the assumedly desirable objective of a free-trade area in North
America.
Some of the participants simply felt that the potential for creating a
more efficient North American auto industry made the effort worth-
while. Least important was pressure from Detroit, even though the Big
Three could have expected to have been the first losers if Canada had
chosen to react harshly to a countervailing duty (perhaps by boosting the
domestic content requirement to 90%). The companies were consulted,
as were the parts makers, but not until after the initial discussions with
the Canadians had shown that agreement might be possible.
A final note must be made about the political environment in the
United States at that time. After the intergovernmental agreement had
been reached and signed, the Johnson Administration still had to obtain
Congressional approval in the form of an enabling statute. This could
have been a serious obstacle, especially after the side arrangements be-
tween the government of Canada and the auto companies had been made
public. But the Big Three and many parts producers favored the agree-
ment and, most important, the Administration was still living in the
highly favorable climate created by LBJ's 1964 landslide election win.
Although the vote in the Senate turned out to be uncomfortably close,
there was never any real doubt about the outcome.
These were the rather unique conditions surrounding the 1964 nego-
tiations, which in fact were completed within a matter of six months. To
summarize:
1) We were dealing with a major industry, dominated by a few large
companies which operated in both countries and produced virtually iden-
tical products in each.
2) Tariffs clearly were a major obstacle to integration and greater
efficiency. The Canadian segment had no practical way to achieve the
specialization and scale economies needed to bring its higher costs down
as long as the tariff regimes were in place.
3) The countervailing duty case gave momentum and urgency to the
search for another solution. This mattered particularly for the United
States officials, because there was the threat that a court order would be
issued to force the application of the Tariff Act to Canadian imports.
4) Finally, the political circumstances were right, if not quite ideal.
It is fair to say that these conditions cannot all be replicated for
sectors today. But every sector is, in some respects, unique. The lesson
is not that other sectoral agreements are infeasible because they will dif-
fer from automobiles, but rather that it would be wrong to attach much
weight to an event now twenty years in the past. The auto talks suc-
ceeded in 1964 for reasons peculiar to the time.
A further question is whether the Agreement-as it has worked
practically-represents a positive or negative factor in relation to possi-
ble new sectoral trade arrangements. As has been seen, the Agreement
[Vol. 10:63 1985]
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was followed by, and to a large degree responsible for, a huge expansion
of trade in the automobile sector. At the same time, its operation was
long accompanied by highly vocal misgivings in both countries. A lesson
is to be found there as well.
III. EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE AUTOPACT
Automotive free-trade with Canada was inaugurated in 1965 as
America's merchandise trade balance began its slide toward deficit, after
decades of surpluses. In 1964 the surplus with the world had reached a
peak. During the rest of the decade its trend was downward until, in
1971, the United States had its first trade deficit of the century.
In retrospect, the decline in the trade surplus was an inevitable re-
sult of the long boom that had begun in 1961 and the inflation which
gathered strength during the war in Vietnam. The fashion of the time,
however, was to focus on the misconduct of American trading partners-
especially that of the two largest, Canada and Japan. A positive trade
balance with Canada was a hallowed feature of the balance of payments.
By 1968, however, this most accustomed of trade figures had become
negative, to the then astounding amount of one billion dollars. The sta-
tistical measures used at the time showed a negative balance in automo-
tive trade of $155 million, a swing of $700 million from the 1965 surplus
of $653 million. Moreover, from 1968 on the auto sector balance, viewed
from the American side, worsened. It was not to return to surplus until
1973."1
The circumstance of a deteriorating merchandise balance in general,
and the turnaround in trade with Canada in particular, brought renewed
attention to features of the Agreement that had come under heavy criti-
cism in the Senate during the debate on the enabling legislation. These
were of two kinds. The Agreement itself contained "safeguards," in-
sisted upon by the Canadian side, intended mainly to set a floor on auto-
mobile production in Canada. In addition, the American owned auto
companies had committed themselves separately to an increase in Cana-
dian production. They had agreed to raise the total of Canadian value-
added by $220 million over the 1964 level by the year 1968.
I will defer comments on the actual impact of and justifications for
the safeguards and the ancillary commitments, other than to note that
they were, of course, restrictions on free trade. The 1968 "comprehen-
sive review" called for in the Agreement left the restrictions untouched,
as did further talks in 1969. Within the Executive Branch, and among
some members of Congress as well, the view hardened that the Canadi-
ans not only had rigged the Agreement in the first place but now were
11 A joint study in 1970 led to a revision in the method of accounting for trade in vehicles and
parts under the Automotive Agreement. The revised method showed a diminishing U.S. surplus
between 1966-69 and actual deficits between 1970-72. Id. at 315 (table 103).
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acting in bad faith by refusing to modify in any way the terms which had
"unfairly" converted the American trade surplus into a deficit.
Nowhere was this view held more fiercely than in the Treasury De-
partment, the defender of the beleaguered American dollar. (The Treas-
ury's animus against the Agreement may have been the greater because it
was Treasury officers who had presented the Administration's economic
case for the enabling legislation in 1965. The testimony had included an
assurance to the Congress that our surplus in bilateral automotive trade
would be essentially unchanged through 1968.) At the Camp David
meeting in 1971, where the decision was taken to leave the Bretton
Woods form of the gold standard and to impose a temporary tariff
surcharge, a further and apparently less definitive decision was made to
announce the intention of abrogating the Agreement. A Treasury press
release, which included this announcement, had already been run off for
distribution before protests from the State Department caused its re-
moval and the project abandoned.
This rescue did not end the controversy. Proposals to repeal the
enabling legislation appeared regularly in the Congress. One of these was
included in 1970 trade legislation and came close to being enacted, dying
only in the last days of the session. In 1975, the Senate Finance Commit-
tee had the International Trade Commission prepare a "thorough analy-
sis" of the workings of the Agreement, with particular emphasis on
whether Canada had "fully complied with its letter and spirit by phasing
out the so-called 'transitional provisions.'" The Commission reported
back, in effect, that Canada had not done so."2
With the passage of time, however, the opposition in the United
States has diminished. After 1972, the sectoral trade balance returned to
surplus, which in itself mollified some of the critics-and evidently gave
the Canadians a turn at being the grievers. Now, although the 1982-84
automotive balance has registered an extraordinary swing to a Canadian
surplus, there has been no outburst of any kind on this side of the border.
Nevertheless, the hostility that was aroused in the earlier period is
relevant to the outlook for either new sectoral agreements or an across-
the-board free-trade understanding. It will be necessary to expect that
the closest scrutiny will be given to clauses or commitments which can be
interpreted as being one-sided in favor of Canadian industry. The Amer-
ican negotiators will have to be wary indeed of accepting anything that
could be seized upon as appearing to give an "unfair" advantage to Can-
ada. One assumes, of course, that both parties to any new agreement will
have to make provision for especially sensitive sectors, and for the antici-
pated difficulties of actually moving to free-trade. If the resulting ar-
rangements can be shown to be balanced, there should be no great
difficulty. But it would be unwise to suppose that any transitional provi-
sions will be accepted on faith by the American Congress.
12 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 359.
[Vol. 10:63 1985]
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IV. RESULTS OF THE AUTOPACT
This legacy from the 1965 Agreement is a reality, entirely apart
from the substance of the American complaints. When the Agreement
was being negotiated, many of us recognized that significantly lower
wage scales, together with the evident possibilities for productivity gains,
would make Canada relatively attractive to the auto industry for invest-
ment and expansion. Assurances to the Congress that the trade balance
would be unchanged were made plausible only by assuming that the Ca-
nadian car market would continue, for the time being, to grow more rap-
idly than the American. When this assumption was not realized, the
perfectly foreseeable consequence was that the balance shifted noticeably,
if temporarily, to Canada. Thus the companies' promises to increase out-
put in Canada were little more than statements that managements would
pursue the profit maximizing policy which their stockholders expected of
them.
The Canadian negotiators made their case for the safeguards and
commitments principally on the assertion that the company manage-
ments would tend to locate in the United States, either by habit or be-
cause of nationalistic sentiments. They said Canada needed insurance
against this supposed readiness to forego, prospectively, more profitable
alternatives. But, as Carl Beigie has pointed out, the industry's commit-
ments to Canada could hardly have been onerous, since they were in
nearly all cases much oversubscribed. 3 What happened was what might
have been expected-the firms found it advantageous in the first instance
to expand operations in a country where wages were lower and produc-
tivity prospects favorable.
Apart from these commitments, which were made in side letters and
were not part of the Agreement, the safeguards with which Canada sur-
rounded the Agreement had as their principal effect the skewing of pro-
duction toward assembly and away from component parts. The means
used was to define an auto "manufacturer" in special terms: 1) it would
have to produce, in Canada, a high fixed percentage of the vehicle sold in
Canada; and 2) it would have to achieve Canadian content (value added)
in vehicles produced in Canada in an absolute dollar amount no lower
than had been the case in 1964. Failure to meet these definitional re-
quirements would mean failure to qualify for duty-free treatment.
1 4
Neither of these restrictions prevented rapid progress toward inte-
gration of Canadian and American automotive production. The floor on
vehicle production in Canada could be met by concentrating on the as-
sembly of a few models, exporting the surplus, and importing the remain-
13 BEIGIE, supra note 5, at 97-106.
14 A relatively minor restriction imposed by Canada was to insist that passenger cars, trucks,
and buses be treated as separate classes of vehicles, each with its own production-to-sales ratio. The
effect was to prevent a producer from discontinuing, for example, truck assembly in Canada in favor
of passenger cars. This provision was a clear vote against efficiency.
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ing models needed to meet the wishes of Canadian consumers. The
content requirement was truly transitional, since its constraint would di-
minish as vehicle output rose.
Handed these specific incentives, the auto companies sensibly put
their emphasis on the production of finished cars, trucks and buses.
They had assembled 666,000 cars, trucks and buses in 1964-with ex-
ports and imports to and from the United States negligible. Ten years
later, after the effects of the side commitments and the transitional re-
quirements had been fully assimilated, vehicle output had reached 1.5
million units, while vehicle imports from the United States were 650,000
and exports 900,000. By that time, the trade pattern which had emerged
was one of sizable Canadian positive balance in vehicle trade-900 mil-
lion in 1974-and a considerably larger American surplus in the parts
trade-$2.1 billion the same year.15
It is by no means evident that this represented the most efficient
allocation of resources in Canada. David L. Emerson, 16 has argued per-
suasively that when labor, capital, materials and transport (to market)
costs were compared, the Canadian advantage was quite strong in parts
and accessories manufacturing, whereas the northeastern United States
was a more cost-efficient location for assembly operations. That is,
sectoral free-trade, minus the Canadian restrictions, would likely have
led to relatively more production and employment in the parts segment
of the industry. (Emerson believes that employment in Canada would
have been greater in that case.) Moreover, during the first dozen years of
the Agreement, auto prices in Canada were consistently and significantly
higher than in the United States. If, as is also plausible, the differential
existed because the manufacturers were seeking to recapture higher Ca-
nadian production costs, then the Canadian consumer, as well as the Ca-
nadian economy generally, was a loser from the limitation placed on full
free-trade.
These are hypotheses, not proven facts. Even if they are correct, it
remains true that the Canadian part of the North American industry did
gain considerably in efficiency from the reshuffling that took place as a
result of the elimination of tariffs. By now, after twenty years of tariff-
free trade, the various sections of the industry have no doubt made fur-
ther adjustments. It is not unlikely that the allocation of automotive pro-
duction in Canada now closely approximates that of a complete free-
trade situation (though in an oligopolistic industry).
The point, however, is that the effort to promote and protect what
were considered to be basic Canadian economic interests may have been
15 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at app. A; TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE OPERATION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS TRADE ACT
oF 1965, 13 (1977).
16 D. EMERSON, PRODUCTION LOCATION AND THE AUTOMOTIVE AGREEMENT (Economic
Council of Canada 1975).
[V/ol. 10:63 1985]
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misdirected and surely was overdone. That there were strong political
pressures at work 17 may explain why the effort had to be made, but it
would be wrong to assume that the special features in the automobile
instance provide a desirable model for other possible sectoral agreements.
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Where should U.S.-Canada trade policy go from here? The
AutoPact has survived and prospered during its twenty years, in spite of
periodic outbursts of dissatisfaction from one or the other parties. Inte-
gration of North American auto production has created a situation in
which neither the companies, nor the governments, would be ready to
contemplate the disruption which would be caused by restoration of tar-
iffs.18 Japanese competition and onrushing technology are changing the
industry. But, for the immediate future at least, the Agreement appears
to be secure. Even a determined effort to get at the American trade defi-
cit by a general surcharge or similar restrictive action would almost
surely have to exclude Canadian automotive products.
Then why not pursue additional sectoral arrangements, as was ten-
tatively proposed by Ottawa in 1982-1984? For all its problems, sectoral
free-trade in autos has worked well. A successful negotiation covering
other industries could widen the area of Canadian-American free-trade
and shield the sectors concerned from some, if not all, future trade-re-
strictive decisions made in Washington or Ottawa. Moreover, some of
the reasons for opposing sectoral agreements are not compelling.
It is often observed that most Canadian-American trade is already
free of tariffs: the more or less authoritative figure is that once the Tokyo
Round reductions have been put in place, 80% of U.S. imports from and
65% of exports to Canada will cross the border duty free. 9 That being
so, why go to the trouble of negotiating further?
The argument is that either the remaining dutiable products are not
important or the applicable duties are so low as to be of little moment. It
is likely, however, that the non-free sectors are the most steadfastly and
heavily protected simply because they are considered to be non-competi-
tive, that is, inefficient. On this reasonable supposition, they are the
places where the prospective gains from trade ought to be the greatest.
Also, we must remember that the high percentage of trade that is already
free is attributable in largest part to the Agreement. One-third of last
year's exports to and imports from Canada (by value) took the form of
17 C. Beigie has said the Canadian government could not have signed the Agreement without
the production increase commitments from the manufacturers. BEIGIE, supra note 5, at 48.
18 "It [the agreement] is assuredly the most successful trade policy in the history of one indus-
try....It served to rationalize...U.S. and Canadian operation into an integrated North American auto
industry." R. B. Smith, supra note 9.
19 W. BROCK, U.S.-CANADIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 65 (1984).
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mainly non-dutiable automotive products.2° Set this sector's trade apart,
and the non-dutiable shares of imports are considerably less prepossess-
ing: for U.S. imports the principal components are natural gas and news-
print;2  the machinery category (minus transport equipment) consists
primarily of dutiable goods, which is also true of miscellaneous
manufactures.
An objection to negotiating to eliminate tariffs, whether by sector or
on a broader basis, is that non-tariff barriers are more important in U.S.-
Canadian trade. The basis for this position is elusive. In their bilateral
trade neither Canada nor the United States is greatly addicted to the
worst kind of non-tariff barrier: the import quota. Steel, on which the
Canadian side is said to set a "voluntary" quantitative limit on exports to
keep the U.S. from itself imposing a quota on imports, is the principal
current exception. In any case, a free-trade arrangement would need to
make replacing the erstwhile tariffs with quota restrictions a clear viola-
tion of the bilateral understanding.
"Buy-American" and "Buy-Canadian" rules for government
purchases are more difficult to deal with, partly because state and provin-
cial governments cannot easily be bound in their buying decisions by
what national authorities would like. Still, Canada and the United States
are signatories of the GATT code on public procurement. They could
readily tighten the rules at a national level for their bilateral purposes-if
that were considered desirable, as it ought to be. Even if the choice made
was to ignore the taxpayer interest, and that of the national economy, it
is hard to believe a failure to extend free-trade more fully to the govern-
mental sectors would make free-trade in other sectors irrelevant.
Actions against export subsidies and export dumping are sometimes
listed as non-tariff barriers-not always incorrectly. However, the
GATT proscribes both subsidies and dumping and establishes standards
for such counter actions as countervailing or antidumping duties. As a
practical matter, few if any governments would be prepared to forego
these GATT rights. Furthermore, actionable export subsidies and
dumping are not the most common events on the international trading
scene.
Governments undoubtedly are capable of inventing ingenious ways
to avoid accepting the benefits of unfettered international trade. It is not
unreasonable to believe that greater free-trade between the United States
and Canada would excite innovation in the non-tariff area, as it seem-
ingly has in the European Community. This is a risk against which abso-
lute insurance is impossible. One can observe, however, that whatever
has taken place in Europe-which is often held up as the non-tariff hor-
20 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE, B16-17,
C20-23 (Nov. 1984).
21 Id at CIO-11.
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ror example-there is no movement among the governments to return to
the European tariff regimes.
A further and more telling argument is that a bilateral trade deal
along sectoral lines would violate the GATT. Since the United States
and Canada have an important interest in an effectively functioning
GATT, this is a serious matter. Bilateral arrangements as such run
counter to the fundamental GATT principle of non-discrimination.
Sectoral bargains on other than multilateral bases fall under the same
proscription. The answer is that a Canadian-American agreement to re-
move duties for a number of new sectors could bring the duty-free share
of total trade to a "substantially all" level of 90%. At that point, the
agreement could be presented as a free-trade area sanctioned by GATT
Article XXIV-a justifiable exception to the non-discrimination princi-
ple. Taking into account precedent, the Contracting Parties to the
GATT could hardly say no.
But even if the GATT problem could thus be resolved technically,
the underlying issue remains. Does it make good economic sense for the
United States and Canada to lock themselves into arrangements which
will tend to narrow the possibilities for specialization on a global basis?2
There is a big world around us, and gains from trade can be expected if
markets are made reasonably and non-discriminatorily open. How much
should we limit our horizons? Unless we have given up on prospects for
further progress toward freer multilateral trade, the question is a perti-
nent one.
The question becomes more pertinent, especially for Canada, as we
contemplate negotiating sector-by-sector deals. Comprehensive free-
trade between the United States and Canada would tend to maximize the
probability that both economies would become more productive, with
higher potential incomes. That indeed is the crucial rationale for making
the effort at all. It cannot be certain whether these gains would be suffi-
cient to offset the benefits foregone because of a possible narrowing of
trade opportunities elsewhere, but the chances would be enhanced.
Confining the bargain to selected sectors would have to be a second
(or third, if multilateral liberalization is included) best outcome. The
selection process itself would all but assure that. Economic criteria for
choosing one sector over another are shaky enough. The officials in
charge would be pressed, on political grounds, to pick sectors least likely
to arouse opposition-and least promising for promoting efficiency.
Any undertaking to eliminate barriers to trade is bound to lead to
some reallocation of resources. There will be losses in employment and
capital values in some sectors, gains in others. With gradual reductions
in the barriers and with good luck in the macroeconomic arena, the ad-
22 In 1965, the Automotive Agreement could be defended as applying to a relatively unique
product-the North American automobile-leaving largely unaffected U.S. and Canadian imports
of the smaller fuel efficient vehicles from Europe and Japan.
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justments among the losers need not be painful, as the experiences of the
European Community and the European Free Trade Association
demonstrate.
If, however, free-trade is to be a selective matter, other and conceiv-
ably less tractable problems may be anticipated. This is because, among
the chosen industries under free-trade, some will have been advantaged
and will be newly able to attract labor (with high wages) and capital
(with high returns). To a degree, these new demands for resources will
be accommodated by shifts from sectors which will cut back as a result of
the post-free-trade reshuffle. But the pressures will tend to spill over to
the sectors that have been excluded from the free-trade arrangement alto-
gether. These sectors, which by definition cannot share directly in pro-
ductivity advances from free-trade, will nevertheless face rising wage and
capital costs and are likely to be the chief long term losers. Within Can-
ada's relatively small economy, the distortions and political tensions
from this source conceivably could make sectoral free-trade considerably
less rewarding than had been hoped.
VI. CONCLUSION
These reflections have been in response to a query about the rele-
vance of the AutoPact to further sectoral free-trade arrangements. I
have suggested that the Agreement of 1965, while not irrelevant, does
not furnish much of a model for 1985 and beyond. I have also argued, in
accord with my personal prejudices, that a comprehensive (or as nearly
comprehensive as possible) U.S.-Canada free-trade area is much to be
preferred to additional sectoral accords.
The intelligence from Canada now seems to tell us that misgivings
about either approach, and their possible consequences for Canadian in-
dependence, have not diminished very much. Since the 1984 U.S. Trade
Bill states the American side can negotiate only if the initiative comes
from Ottawa, it is not evident that any forward motion is a near-term
prospect. Meanwhile, progress toward another multilateral trade round
apparently has quickened. If these are the current realities, then the in-
terest of Ottawa and Washington should be to concentrate on making the
new round as big and far-reaching as can be achieved. Within that kind
of context will be found multiple opportunities to reduce and remove
obstacles to U.S.-Canada trade. In the world as it is, this may prove to
be the best approach after all.
[Vol. 10:63 1985]
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